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ABSTRACT: Various aspects of the criminal justice system of the eight-
eenth-century Republic of Dubrovnik (criminality, out-of-court settlements,
penalties and other repressive measures, etc.) are analyzed in order to reach
some conclusions about social groups, their shape, and cohesion. The village
and the household in rural areas, as well as the Jewish community in the city,
were groups with especially strong and multifaceted social ties. For this rea-
son, they were not only a natural environment for violent crimes to rise, but
also a suitable target of the repressive policy.
Nella Lonza, member of the Institute for Historical Sciences of the Croatian Academy of Sci-
ences and Arts in Dubrovnik. Address: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, Lapadska obala
6, 20000 Dubrovnik, Croatia.
Research which considers the history of crime and criminal justice to be
an important part of social history has progressed considerably over the last
twenty years by introducing new questions and by focusing on unexplored
topics. Analyses of court records and other legal sources have contributed
considerably to our understanding of such social phenomena as social ten-
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1 For an excellent review essay, see Xavier Rousseaux’s, “Crime, justice and society in medi-
eval and modern times: 30 years of crime and criminal justice history”. Crime, History & Socie-
ties 1 (1997): pp. 87-118. See also the special issue of the International Association for the His-
tory of Crime and Criminal Justice Bulletin 14 (1991).
sion, the various means of maintaining order, and their efficacy.1 In my opin-
ion, there would be room for yet another perspective on criminal justice data
in order to reach some conclusions about the shape of social groups and their
internal cohesion.
The aim of this paper is to propose some inferences about the social struc-
ture of the eighteenth-century Republic of Dubrovnik, drawing from the crimi-
nal justice system. Since complementary studies on the history of Dubrovnik
in the period of the Ancien Régime are not comprehensive, some points of
this paper have to be understood as provisional and partial deductions about
Dubrovnik’s society. Also, some phenomena present in the eighteenth-cen-
tury records may be looked upon as relics of an earlier period. Nevertheless,
I hope to show that the “criminal justice perspective” on social groups could
be profitable and stimulative for further research.
The data used for this paper derive from different types of juridical sources.
The first one consists of legal provisions. The most important laws of the
Republic were collected in four consecutive law books: the Statute of 1272,
the Liber omnium reformationum (14th c.), the Liber viridis (14th-15th c.),
and the Liber croceus (15th c.-1808). Since the ideology of the Dubrovnik
state was very firmly grounded on the idea of continuity and tradition, these
legal collections were never derogated and all formal changes were strictly
restrained. The Republic of Dubrovnik itself always exhibited them as the
foundations of legal practice. Certainly, the transformations that Dubrovnik
society experienced over the centuries demanded changes in the legal sphere.
But, most of them were introduced into the legal system sub rosa. Therefore,
I have taken into consideration only those ancient laws whose application in
the eighteenth century can be confirmed. Actually, criminal justice was
strongly shaped by the consistent practice of the court (stylus curiae). In or-
der to deduce its rules and analyze some other legal and social phenomena, I
have examined all the eighteenth-century Criminal Court sentences (2,307
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2 The Criminal Court had jurisdiction over all types of crimes for the entire territory of the
Republic of Dubrovnik, with three exceptions. In the first place, clerics were submitted to the ju-
risdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. Furthermore, patricians elected as local counts tried petty
crimes in their territorial unit. Finally, in politically sensitive cases, ad hoc tribunals were estab-
lished. The eighteenth-century criminal sentences are kept in the series Criminalia (hereafter cited
as C), ser. 16, vols. 6-8. Claims and the proceedings are recorded in Lamenta Criminalia (hereaf-
ter cited as Lam. Crim.), ser. 50.3, vols. 42-213. All the documents are kept in the State Archives
of Dubrovnik.
cases) and a sample from the Claims Register (2,857 cases), in addition to
some complementary judicial sources.2
Working on such a diverse corpus of archival material, I have tried to iso-
late two elements: the social groups that the criminal justice system referred
to, and the type of relationship that existed between these groups and the
authorities (in terms of both official policy and reality). Furthermore, I tried
to reach some conclusions about the cohesion and internal structure of the
groups in question.
Social groups referred to in the criminal justice system
The criminal justice system of the Ancien Régime Republic of Dubrovnik
approached every person as an individual with a definite social position. Both
the culprit and the victim were automatically classified as individuals of cer-
tain social rank, gender, age, etc. These characteristics had important conse-
quences upon the jurisdiction, the procedure, the penalties applied, and many
other more subtle elements of the criminal justice policy. For instance, patri-
cians were not usually submitted to ordinary court proceedings, rather an ad
hoc tribunal was created, and only under very exceptional circumstances could
they be imprisoned or tortured, females could not be condemned to certain
types of penalties, and the testimony of a minor was not taken as complete
proof. However, in this paper I will not refer to such examples of how one’s
social condition affected the administration of justice. The relationship be-
tween the individual members of these social strata or “groups” was almost
non-existent or very vague, as there was very little or no cohesion among them.
Hence, the repressive policy was never directed against any other member of
such a random cluster, but only against the perpetrator himself. But if the
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criminal justice system of Dubrovnik did address the social group to which a
criminal or a victim belonged, in principle it had to be a community provided
with structure.
The smallest social group that the criminal justice system took into con-
sideration was the household.3 The fact that the penal policy focused more
on the household than on the family is not surprising, since the household
was a rather strong unit of people who shared many elements of everyday
life, housekeeping, and farming. The household as a group of co-resident
persons was involved in the criminal justice system in many ways. Some
penalties or repressive measures directly affected the entire household. In some
cases, we see that other members of the family/household felt very embar-
rassed by the disgraceful penalty of their relative/co-resident. The attitude of
the domestic group towards their fellow-member who committed the crime
depended not only upon the acts of the authorities, but also upon whether the
committed crime was perceived by the community as abominable, or it fit
into the community’s internal code of honor.4
As I already stated above, the criminal justice system rarely referred to
the family as a group of persons linked by the relation of kinship. Certainly,
a family unit and a household could (and sometimes did) coincide, but this is
not the point.
Besides the household and the rural community, another social group stands
out in the criminal justice system. Namely, when damage was done to the
crops, the owners of livestock were called to court. This kind of collective
 3 In the eighteenth-century Republic of Dubrovnik different types of households co-existed,
with a high presence of extended and multiple households in rural areas. See Nenad VekariÊ, “The
influence of demographic trends on number of undivided family households in southern Croatia”.
The History of the Family 1 (1996) 4: pp. 461-476; Niko KapetaniÊ and Nenad VekariÊ, Stanovniπtvo
Konavala, 1. Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1998: pp. 332-337. For a typology
of domestic groups in general, see Peter Laslett, “Introduction: The history of the family”. In:
Household and family in past time, ed. P. Laslett and R. Wall. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1972: p. 31. Some sets of tendencies of the “Mediterranean domestic group organization”
will correspond well with Dubrovnik’s social structure, but not all of them (comp. Peter Laslett,
“Family and household as work group and kin group: areas of traditional Europe compared”. In:
Family forms in historic Europe, ed. R. Wall, J. Robin and P. Laslett. Cambridge [etc.]: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1983: pp. 526-527).
4 These arguments are elaborated below.
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responsibility was based not only on the common-sense supposition of how
the damage could have occurred, but also on the idea that it was the common
responsibility to try to prevent any possible act of damage.
The criminal justice system referred to the rural communities frequently
and in many ways. The territory of the Republic of Dubrovnik in the eight-
eenth century included a 180-kilometer-long strip of coastal land (which in
only two sections extended farther than 10 km inland) and several islands.
Some 80 percent of its approximately 30,000 inhabitants lived in the coun-
tryside.5 The city of Dubrovnik itself was the only larger urban center (with
6,564 inhabitants in 1807).6 The villages varied in size: while some had no
more than a few dozen inhabitants, others were more than 300 strong. The
larger villages were often divided into hamlets.7
Very often, the village community corresponded territorially with three
other social entities: confraternity, parish, and the so-called kaznaËina.8 In
the city, confraternities were assembled according to different criteria (pro-
fession, social condition, residence, family tradition, etc.). In the countryside,
however, a confraternity was territorially shaped and usually consisted of the
inhabitants of one village (or of one hamlet of a larger village), with the par-
ish church as its center. KaznaËina was a territorial unit upon which the crimi-
nal justice system relied. It could include more than one village, but this was
5 The complete census of the population of 1807 reports the Republic of Dubrovnik as having
31,245 inhabitants (see Vladimir StipetiÊ, “BrojËani pokazatelji razvoja stanovniπtva na teritoriju
negdaπnje DubrovaËke Republike u minula tri stoljeÊa (1673-1981).” Anali Zavoda za povijesne
znanosti JAZU u Dubrovniku 27 (1989): pp. 96-97). Since this census was effectuated before the
great migratory waves of the nineteenth century started, it can be used as an indication of the eight-
eenth-century level.
6 Ibidem.
7 The data per village are reported in the (incomplete) 1673/4 census. See Zdravko ©undrica,
“Popis stanovniπtva DubrovaËke Republike iz 1673/74”. Arhivski vjesnik 2 (1959): pp. 235-295.
8 Because village, parish, confraternity, and kaznaËina usually coincided, the use of these terms
in the sources is not strictly differentiated. Hereafter in this paper I will consistently use the terms
“village” and “rural community”. For more details about the shape of the confraternities, parishes,
villages and kaznaËine in the region of Konavle, see Niko KapetaniÊ and Nenad VekariÊ,
Stanovniπtvo Konavala, 2. Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1999: pp. 20, 24-40.
On the overlapping of the forms of social organization in the Castilian hamlet Valdemora, see Susan
Freeman, Neighbors: The Social Contract in a Castilian Hamlet. Chicago [etc.]: University of
Chicago Press, 1970: p. 41.
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rarely the case. The inhabitants of each village would elect one man from
among themselves to be its kaznac—i.e., the person who was to represent
them before the authorities in criminal matters. The kaznac had to report se-
rious crimes (which were to be prosecuted ex officio) to the central authori-
ties; he represented the village in trials in which collective responsibility was
invoked; he had to organize the capture of criminals or bandits; and occa-
sionally, he had to act as the representative of the kaznaËina at public execu-
tions.9 The kaznac was entrusted with the “vertical” communication between
the village and the central authorities. The fact that he was a member of the
same rural community had some obvious advantages: he knew the people and
the situation better than any outsider; he could get needed information more
easily; his acts in the name of the authorities were probably accepted with
less reluctance than would have been the case with any other official; and he
performed his duties free of charge.10
Villages were assembled into broader territorial units. In the eighteenth
century, the countryside of the Republic of Dubrovnik was divided into eleven
districts (kneæije).11 In each of these, a local count (usually a young patrician
elected by the Great Council) had the jurisdiction to try minor civil and crimi-
nal cases, and it was his task to execute the decrees of the central authorities.
Kneæije were formed according to administrative needs and were shaped by
historical circumstances. It is quite logical that these administrative bounda-
ries were unimportant in terms of social life. The territory of the district was
usually too large to promote social cohesion of any kind. In fact, the size of
the districts often proved to be a hindrance to the efficiency of the state’s
institutions.12
9 See examples of his functions in Lam. Crim., vol. 52, f. 208; vol. 59, f. 90v; vol. 134, f.
207v; vol. 194, f. 129v; Diplomata et Acta saec. XVIII, ser. 76, vol. 3399, no. 15.
10 For more details see Nella Lonza, Pod plaπtem pravde: Kaznenopravni sustav DubrovaËke
Republike u XVIII. stoljeÊu. Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1997: pp. 99-102.
11 For a short survey of territorial units and the competencies of the local counts, see ibid.: pp.
58-59 and 124.
12 N. VekariÊ has shown that the changing of the seat of the local count in one of Dubrovnik’s
territorial units had clear consequences on criminal justice. Because the new location required the
inhabitants of several villages to travel farther, the number of their accusations for petty crimes
was diminished. When the count’s seat was returned to its previous location, the number of such
cases rose again (see Nenad VekariÊ, “Sud Janjinske kapetanije”. Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti
JAZU u Dubrovniku 27 (1989): p. 139). This is a clear example of how practical reasoning af-
fected the functioning of state institutions.
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Repressive measures directed towards the social group
In the criminal justice system of eighteenth-century Dubrovnik, certain
penalties, as well as other types of repressive measures, were explicitly di-
rected not at the individual, but at his social group. In other cases, the com-
munity of the convicted was not the immediate target of the punitive policy,
yet it was indirectly affected by the social consequences of the penalty
(dishonor).
Banishment was most often directed against the convicted himself. But at
times, it was extended to his family, as was the case after the suppression of
the insurrection in the region of Konavle in 1800, when the rebels’ families
were banished to remote districts of the Republic.13 This displacement was
also thought to obstruct any attempt to instigate a new rebellion.
In cases of treason and some other major crimes against the state, the au-
thorities not only severely punished the offender and banished his family, but
they also devastated their place of dwelling:14 all the buildings had to be de-
molished, and the soil sterilized with salt. In this way, both literally and sym-
bolically, the dwelling was never allowed to be restored to life. This penalty
shows that the household and dwelling were conceived as a form of extended
being. The destruction of the dwellings was one of the most eloquent expres-
sions of the triumph of the state’s authority. Furthermore, it was likely to have
a preventive effect by inciting strong social control between the co-residents.
In other situations, collective punishment afflicted not the household, but
the family. For example, when a serious crime was committed by a patrician,
all of his kin could be excluded from the nobility. This sanction was applied
very rarely, and the last case occurred in 1696, when a member of the Bosdari
13 See Stjepan Antoljak, “Konavoska buna u srediπtu jednog dijela evropske diplomacije”. Rad
JAZU 286 (1952): pp. 135-136. Other examples: Acta Consilii Rogatorum (hereafter cited as Acta
Cons. Rog.), ser. 3, vol. 140, ff. 157v-158; vol. 145, f. 200rv; vol. 203, ff. 151v-152; vol. 205, f.
23.
14 See Acta Cons. Rog., vol. 140, ff. 157v-158; vol. 145, 200rv; Acta Consilii Maioris (here-
after cited as Acta Cons. Maior.), ser. 8, vol. 54, ff. 258v-259; vol. 55, f. 28rv; KapetaniÊ-VekariÊ,
Stanovniπtvo Konavala 1: p. 72, n. 122.
15 Acta Cons. Maior., vol. 52, ff. 168v-169; vol. 54, f. 45rv.
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family wounded another patrician.15 In 1707 and 1718 two branches of this
family succeeded in obtaining pardon and were re-established among the
nobility. However, in order to understand the application of this penalty, it
has to be mentioned that the Bosdaris had not received noble rank until 1676,
and because of that, in public life they were always treated as second-rate
patricians. Their social position could explain why, in this particular case, the
authorities were less indulgent and penalized the whole family.
In the above-mentioned cases the social groups were directly punished.
Still, in many other situations the penalty indirectly afflicted the family/house-
hold or the broader social group. Because the life of an individual depended
upon his family/household in many ways, the consequences of his penalty
also spread to his social environment. For instance, all fines had to be col-
lected and paid in a short period of time,16 the family/household was sup-
posed to provide food for the prisoner,17 etc.
Sentence and punishment also affected the family’s honor, leaving marks
on its good name. How harsh the social consequences in a particular case
proved to be, depended on how the crime was evaluated by the internal code
of the social environment. With some “crimes”, for example, the village com-
munity was indulgent, estimating that the offender had good reasons for his
behavior, in which case his family/household would not be the victim of so-
cial repulsion. But in some cases, especially when the purpose of the penalty
was to degrade the condemned person, the social effects of punishment con-
tinued throughout the life of the convict’s kin. For example, in a petition to
the authorities, a convicted woman accepted a ten-year banishment, but asked
for a pardon from pillory, arguing that otherwise her parents would be
dishonored forever.18 In another case, when a girl was sentenced to prison,
to be paraded through the city sitting backwards on a donkey, and to expo-
sure at the pillory, her family asked for a pardon. They persuaded the authori-
16  In the criminal records there are no indications of how this money was collected. However,
each household usually had a common budget. Furthermore, the circulation of money within the
rural communities in the Republic of Dubrovnik was restricted, since many households could barely
produce any goods for a market. Thus, the payment of a fine probably required an extra effort by
the entire household.
17 See Lonza, Pod plaπtem pravde: p. 175.
18 Acta Cons. Maior., vol. 60, interleaf 16, ad f. 170.
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ties to convert the shameful procession and the pillory into an extra year of
prison. Their argument was that the original sentence would have heavily
affected the honor of the entire family and therefore, severely jeopardized the
future of the convict’s two unmarried sisters, making their chances of find-
ing husbands very slim.19
Passing now to other compulsory measures directed at the social group,
the porob should also be mentioned. In the Republic of Dubrovnik this was
a repressive measure by which the authorities put the offender himself, his
household, or his village under heavy pressure in order to make them coop-
erate with the court.20 The porob consisted of an expedition of regular sol-
diers (mercenaries) or, more often, from a special military unit of the inhab-
itants of the Republic borderline (upisnici).21 These units did not perform any
specific action, but had to be accommodated at the expense of the household
or village. This measure was applied in two situations. Sometimes, the Crimi-
nal Court would insert a clause in the sentence, stating that if the convict dis-
regarded the punishment, soldiers were to be sent to stay in his house until
execution of the punishment began.22 It is obvious that the whole household
had to share the economic weight and the social uneasiness provoked by the
presence of the soldiers, which inclined them to impel the convict to obey
the court. The other scenario would occur when a criminal escaped. The au-
thorities then proclaimed that if he were to return to the territory of the Re-
public, the village where he was seen would have to notify them of his pres-
ence.23 Most often, such proclamations were directed at the criminal’s own
rural community, because it was expected that he would go back to his own
village. However, in a number of very important cases, the proclamation was
made throughout the district, or even the entire territory of the state. In a proc-
19 Acta Cons. Maior., vol. 52, ff. 203v-204v.
20 For more details on the porob, see Lonza, Pod plaπtem pravde: pp. 132-134.
21 Upisnici lived from farming. They were exempt from some taxes, but had to perform cer-
tain military duties. On the military organization of the Republic of Dubrovnik, see Ilija MitiÊ,
“Organizacija kopnene i pomorske obrane dubrovaËke dræave-republike od stjecanja nezavisnosti
1358. do dolaska Francuza 1806. godine”. Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku
24-25 (1987): pp. 103-113.
22 For example, C, vol. 6, ff. 161v, 190, 191v.
23 For example, C, vol. 7, ff. 14, 199v, 166, 239.
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lamation of this kind it was stated that, if a village failed to notify the pres-
ence of the criminal, it would have to be punished by porob, which varied
from a fortnight to a month. Obviously, the second form of porob was strictly
repressive, while the first one had a more complex social significance. How-
ever, these mechanisms of pressure on the social group were not always very
effective; in fact, there were numerous examples of close contact between
escaped criminals and their household or village.24 As for the subject of this
paper, it is not only important that the authorities applied compulsory meas-
ures to the criminal’s social group, but also that in many cases those groups
were rather resistant to such pressures. In my opinion, both of these phenom-
ena, which are documented in the criminal records, can be useful for conclu-
sions about social reality.
Finally, collective responsibility was also invoked when both criminal and
civil liability intertwined.25 That is, in certain cases of theft and field dam-
age when the culprit was either unknown or had escaped, the court pronounced
the sentence against the village where the deed took place.26 Their liability
was objective, and it consisted in the joint payment of the indemnity, the fine,
and the legal expenses. In the course of the trial, the sued community was
given a certain time period in which it could notify the court of the identity
of the actual thief or mischief-doer. If its statement was officially verified,
the village would succeed in freeing itself of collective responsibility.27 If only
24 Interesting material has been analyzed by Vesna MioviÊ-PeriÊ in: Na razmeu: Osmansko-
dubrovaËka granica (1667-1806). Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1997: espe-
cially pp. 137-242.
25 See John Gilissen, “Étude historique comparative des communautés rurales: Essai de synthèse
générale”, Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin pour l’histoire comparative des institutions, vol. 44.
Paris, 1987: p. 808. For the two types of collective responsibility in the rural areas of the Republic
of Venice see Enrico Bassaglia, “Giustizia criminale e organizzazione dell’autorità centrale: la
Repubblica di Venezia e la questione delle taglie in denaro (secoli XVI-XVII)”. In: Stato, società
e giustizia nella Repubblica Veneta (sec. XV-XVIII), 2, ed. G. Cozzi. Roma: Jouvence, 1985: p.
196, n. 6.
26 A sort of collective responsibility, but in cases of homicide, also existed in the Ottoman
Empire. If the murderer was unknown, the blood money would have to be paid by the inhabitants
of the village/city-quarter where the corpse had been found. See Uriel Heyd, Studies in old Otto-
man criminal law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973: pp. 310-311.
27 For example: C, vol. 6, f. 242 and Lam. Crim., vol. 113, f. 17; C, vol. 7, f. 199v and Lam.
Crim., vol. 148, f. 31; C, vol. 7, f. 260v and Lam. Crim., vol. 159, f. 78v.
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after the sentence it became possible to convey the culprit to justice, the vil-
lage which paid the fine could sue him for a reimbursement.28 This institu-
tion of collective responsibility was meant to attain several objectives of the
criminal justice policy. First, the condemnation of the community and the pay-
ment of the indemnity provisionally closed the case. Secondly, the members
of the community were motivated to be on the alert for the presence of out-
siders, for unusual occurrences, and for suspicious movements on their terri-
tory, in order to avoid the financial burden of collective liability. Finally, the
criminal justice system shifted the problem of establishing the facts to the
village. Otherwise, if the culprit were an insider, the central state institutions
would most likely have to face the problem of covering up, i.e. the reluc-
tance of the villagers to cooperate in solving the case. By transferring a seg-
ment of the jurisdiction to the rural community, the state authorities tried to
increase the general efficiency of the justice system while saving expenses at
the same time. Collective responsibility was directed at village communities
and, with one exception, which will be analyzed below, did not apply to the
inhabitants of the city of Dubrovnik. One reason for this might lie in the much
too dynamic circulation of persons in the town for them to be expected to
notice any suspicious acts. But more importantly, the city itself did not have
particular institutions which could assume a delegated jurisdiction.
Punishment as a message to the social group
Punishment in traditional societies was often public and ritual, because it
had to launch an easily intelligible message. It had to demonstrate the triumph
of the state’s authority and its power to re-establish order, and was supposed
to give an abominable example, aimed at intimidating the citizens and pen-
etrating into the collective memory.29
Generally, the authorities tended to direct the message by means of pun-
ishment to a large audience. This was the main reason why penalties were
usually executed in the town of Dubrovnik. Moreover, when punishing the
28 For instance, Lam. Crim., vol. 55, f. 1rv.
29 This topic is discussed in numerous works on criminal justice history.  On penal rituals see
especially Esther Cohen, “Symbols of culpability and the universal language of justice: the ritual
of public executions in late medieval Europe”. History of European Ideas 11 (1989): pp. 407- 416.
Dubrovnik Annals 4 (2000)92
most terrible crimes, the authorities deliberately attracted, intensified, and
prolonged the attention of the public by quartering the corpse of the criminal
and exposing its parts by the roadsides, or at the most visible points of the
landscape.30 However, in some cases the execution of a penalty was carried
out closer to the criminal’s own locality, because the authorities did not want
the people of his community to miss the punitive epilogue of the criminal
behavior it witnessed.31
Punishments for petty crimes were usually executed in the village of the
criminal. Two typical means of punishment were the morica—in which the
criminal was exposed to the public with a heavy stone hanging around his
neck32 —and a public apology made by the offender.33 These acts were sup-
posed to take place in front of the parish church, during or after the Sunday
mass. The morica and the public apology combined the elements of punish-
ment and penance, and were usually applied in cases of slander, personal
offence, or the culprit having shown disrespect for his parents. Since the cat-
egory of honor acquires meaning only within the social context, it had to be
symbolically re-established in the same local environment where the reputa-
tion of the offended came under question.
The autonomous jurisdiction of the village
It is difficult to shed light on the autonomous jurisdiction of village com-
munities, since all communication was oral, and very few related archival
sources exist.34
30 For Dubrovnik practice in the eighteenth century, see Lonza, Pod plaπtem pravde: pp. 145-
148. For comparative data, see Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison. Paris:
Éditions Gallimard, 1975: p. 48; Pieter Spierenburg, Spectacle of suffering: Executions and the
Evolution of Repression from a Preindustrial Metropolis to the European Experience. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984: p. 57; Ruth Pike, “Penal Practicies in Early Modern Spain”.
Criminal Justice History 5 (1984): p. 47; Guido Panico, Il carnefice e la piazza: Crudeltà di Stato
e violenza popolare a Napoli in età moderna. Napoli, 1985: p. 43.
31 For example, in 1753 Ivan UπiÊ and Mato Koprivica were hanged in their home district
(Detta, ser. 6, vol. 62, tergo, f. 1rv).
32 For instance, C, vol. 8, ff. 60 and 117.
33 For example, C, vol. 6, f. 213; vol. 7, ff. 74, 234; vol. 8, ff. 26v, 82v, 212v. The public
apology in Dubrovnik was similar to “amende honorable” in France. See Esther Cohen, Peace-
able domain, certain justice. Hilversum: Verloren, 1996.
34 Cf. Gilissen, “Étude historique”: pp. 809-811.
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Some meager indications can be found in the regulation acts of the
confraternities (matriculae). According to these documents, the village was
entitled to deliver a sentence for petty verbal and physical injuries, such as a
fine or some other minor penalty.35
In fact, the punitive area over which the jurisdiction of the village spread
or occasionally entered was much broader than the matriculae suggest. How-
ever, such cases were made known only via their reference in the acts of state
institutions, either when the Criminal Court accepted the results of an autono-
mous trial,36 or when it reacted to abuse.37 From these examples it can be
discerned that villages seized the jurisdiction in serious matters as well. The
“procedure” which they applied was shaped by local custom, but some ef-
fects of acculturation can also be recognized. For example, it was common
that the village insisted on the confession of the suspect, even by means of
torture, which seems to be a procedure borrowed from the Criminal Court.38
Further, on some occasions the villagers claimed the right to decide on
the fate of their fellow-villager. Their attitude towards the perpetrated crime,
which was based on an internal code of values, was not necessarily the same
as the one proclaimed by the state authorities. Consequently, the efficiency
of the state justice system was challenged in cases when the village gave pre-
cedence to their own moral values and resorted to self-will. This was the case
when they expelled the alleged criminal from the village, or threatened to
lynch him.39 In some other cases they were rather indulgent, allowing the il-
35 See, for example, the regulations of the confraternities of Our Lady of ©unj on the island of
Lopud, St. George in Gruæ, Holy Ascension in Mokoπica, and St. Stephen in Luka ©ipanska
(Bratovπtine i obrtne korporacije u republici dubrovaËkoj od XIII do konca XVIII vijeka, ed. K.
VojnoviÊ. Monumenta historico-iuridica Slavorum Meridionalium, 7. Zagreb: JAZU, 1899-1900:
pp. XV-XVI, XIX, 167; Ante MarinoviÊ, “Lopudska Universitas”. Anali Historijskog instituta u
Dubrovniku 3 (1954): p. 217.
36 For example, Lam. Crim., vol. 214, ff. 85-86v.
37 E.g., Lam. Crim., vol. 97, ff. 63 and 157.
38 See Lam. Crim., vol.  67, f. 103; vol. 73, f. 47; vol. 96, f. 54.
39 For instance Lam. Crim., vol.  97, ff. 25 and 183. For examples of earlier French practice,
see Alfred Soman, “La Justice criminelle aux XVIe-XVIIe siècles: le Parlement de Paris et les
sièges subalternes”. In: idem, Sorcellerie et Justice Criminelle (16e-18e siècles). Aldershot-
Brookfield: Variorum, 1992: VII, p. 27.
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legal presence of the convicted, and withstanding the energetic requests of
the authorities to denounce or capture him.40
Crime within a social group
Another means of understanding interpersonal relations and the shape of
social groups is criminality itself. In 480 cases from a sample of 1,200 cases
tried by the Criminal Court,41 it was possible to ascertain the villages from
which the offender and the victim were.42 The analysis showed that in 304
cases (63 percent) they both lived in the very same village, and in 125 cases
(26 percent) the offender came from a neighboring village, or one which gravi-
tated toward the same local center.43 In the remaining 51 cases (11 percent),
the offender was an inhabitant of a more distant village, a townsman, or a
foreigner.
Naturally, since the etiology of different types of crime was not the same,
the relationship between the criminal and the victim varied too. In this re-
spect, the difference between theft and homicide is more than evident. If we
isolate the thefts in the countryside, we shall see that only in 24 cases (19
percent) were the thief and his victim from the same village. Often was the
case that the members of a gang of thieves came from different villages. One
of the reasons why theft was “exogenous”, in distinction from violent crimes,
was the fact that it was not abrupt, but usually carefully planned in order to
40 See, for example, Vesna MioviÊ-PeriÊ, “Jedna istraga o voama konavoske bune 1799.”.
DubrovaËki horizonti 25 (1995) 35: pp. 75-77: Compare Soman, Justice: VII, p. 36.
41 The research deals only with the portion of the criminality which was tried and recorded.
Further, it should be kept in mind that the Criminal Court of the Republic of Dubrovnik was not
competent for petty crimes outside of the town and the immediately surrounding area. If this were
the case, we could expect the results of the analysis to be even more convincing.
42 In 334 cases both persons lived in the city of Dubrovnik, but I left this figure out of the
analysis because in this area the Criminal Court also tried petty crimes. Also, I left out all the
doubtful cases, either because there existed two villages of the same name, or the information on
the residence of the victim was missing. Moreover, in some cases the name of the hamlet was
indicated, but I was not able to locate it.
43 In the fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century England 81 percent of the homicides were com-
mitted within an area of ten miles of the criminal’s domicile. See Barbara A. Hanawalt, “Violent
Death in Fourteenth- and Early Fifteenth-Century England”. Comparative Studies in Society and
History 18 (1976): p. 309. In the eighteenth-century Würtemberg two thirds of the homicides oc-
curred within the village. See Karl Wegert, Popular Culture, Crime and Social Control in 18th-
Century Württemberg. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994: p. 128.
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avoid risk and increase gain. In addition, if the theft took place in his resi-
dential village, the criminal would have to share the obligation by paying the
indemnity and the fine. Conversely, 69 percent of the cases of homicide were
perpetrated by inhabitants of the same settlement, and another 20 percent by
the inhabitants of nearby villages. Bearing in mind the fact that almost all
murders were committed within the area where both the culprit and the vic-
tim lived, we can say that homicide was a typically “endogenous” crime.
The high rate of (violent) criminal acts among inhabitants of the same
village, or neighboring ones, is to be expected. The majority of any village
population only occasionally left the place. The rural communities remote
from the city were predominantly autarkic in economical and social relations.
Mobility was an exception (especially for women) and was most often con-
nected with feast-days. For this reason, it was natural that the area within
which the criminal and the victim met was as narrow as the environment in
which other manifestations of their social life took place.44 It is interesting
to point out, for example, that it corresponded to the zone within which mar-
riages were most often concluded.45 Thus, violent crimes, as a form of “nega-
tive communication” can paradoxically serve as an indicator of social inter-
action.
A special subset of the category of crimes within the social group is that
of crime between the members of a household or a family. Certainly, many
cases of violence between co-residents never came to the court. For this rea-
son it is more appropriate to concentrate only on homicide, which was diffi-
cult to conceal. Most striking is the fact that almost half of the eighteenth-
century cases of homicide among kin occurred between adult brothers (19
out of 42).46 In the court records, we can often trace previous long-lasting
44 See Yves-Marie Bercé, “Aspects de la criminalité au XVIIe siècle”. Revue historique 92
(1968) 239: p. 41.
45 For the Peljeπac peninsula on Ragusan territory see Nenad VekariÊ, “Primjena tablica
ascendenata u historijskoj demografiji”. Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU 26 (1988): pp.
226-230.
46 In the years 1667-1806 thirty-one cases of homicide between brothers were tried, out of
eighty-two cases of homicide between kin. In the same period there were 33 cases of homicide
between husband and wife. See Nenad VekariÊ, “Ubojstva meu srodnicima u DubrovaËkoj
Republici (1667.-1806.)”. Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku 37 (1999): p.
143.
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tension that finally escalated into extreme violence. The conflict obviously
arose out of the easily affected relationships within the multiple family house-
hold, especially frérèche.47 The diversity of the patterns of households in eight-
eenth-century Dubrovnik society puts this specific form to the test with ex-
amples of households with more individualized features in relation to prop-
erty and decision-making. The multiple family household was rigid, with one
individual being the sole holder of authority (the father, or one of the broth-
ers). There was not enough room for personal ambitions on the part of the
subordinated members, and that was especially difficult for a brother (adult
and usually married) who would have preferred to set up his own household.48
However, the impact of customary law, which was adverse to division, in-
hibited such an issue enormously.49 Thus, the frustration persisted, and the
tension sometimes finally escalated to homicide.50
The social group as a party in an out-of-court settlement
In many criminal cases the culprit tried to reach an out-of-court settlement
with the offended party, since this could produce favorable juridical conse-
quences for him. Some of these agreements, aimed at facilitating and speed-
ing up the procedure of pardon, were written down in court records, espe-
cially when they took place after the sentence was pronounced.
Normally, when it was a case of injury, the victim himself decided whether
he wanted to come to terms with the culprit, and if so, under what conditions
(compensation). But when a homicide took place, neither the close kin, nor
the members of the household could come to a valid compromise with the
defendant: it was the custom that the broader family had to agree upon the
settlement.51 Sometimes this principle was already implied by the number of
47 For more details, see VekariÊ, “Ubojstva meu srodnicima”: pp. 105 and 109.
48 According to Wegert, the non-existence of the homicide cases between natural siblings in
the eighteenth-century Würtenberg was the result of the system of partible inheritance. See Popu-
lar Culture: p. 143.
49 See KapetaniÊ-VekariÊ, Stanovniπtvo Konavala 1: pp. 330-331.
50 See examples quoted by VekariÊ, “Ubojstva meu srodnicima”: p. 106.
51 For instance, Pasko Pendo, convicted for murder, emphasizes in his petition for pardon
“d’aver ottenuto da tutto il parentado… remissione…” (Diplomata et Acta saec. XVIII, vol. 3357,
no. 64).
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(adult) persons involved in this act, which was much higher than the size of
an average household.52 Furthermore, in some cases it is obvious that the kin
involved in the settlement might not be living in the same household.53 It
should also be noted that sometimes not all the relatives gave consent at the
same time, but successively, in groups (probably by household). It is diffi-
cult to determine the true reason for calling a kin to take part in a settlement
of a homicide case. I am inclined to suppose that it had something to do with
blood feud, an institution that was slowly dying out in Dubrovnik society,55
but was still present in this relic.
In traditional societies, reconciliation between the two parties was accom-
panied, at times, by an act of fraternization. Dubrovnik sources mention that
a number of out-of-court settlements were strengthened by a link of marriage
between the two families.56 Since homicides were often unpremeditated and
unintentional, the establishment of new family (or family-like) connections
between the families of the offender and the victim was not so odd as it might
seem to be.
52 For example, in a 1733 settlement, twenty-seven persons were involved on the side of the
victim (C, vol. 6, f. 161). According to the (incomplete) 1673/4 census of the Dubrovnik Republic
population, households with 10 or more members were very rare, and only a few of them reached
15-18 members. See ©undrica, “Popis”, p. 454; (Zdravko ©undrica), “Stanovniπtvo prema popisu
1673/74. koji je provela DubrovaËka Republika”. StatistiËki godiπnjak opÊine Dubrovnik 1980.
Dubrovnik, 1980: pp. 235-295.
53 For instance, in one settlement the wife, brother, and two brothers-in-law of the victim took
part (Acta Cons. Maior., vol. 55, ff. 26v-27); in another, the wife, married daughter, and son (C,
vol. 7, f. 43). In the Republic of Dubrovnik families were virilocal. The only exceptions to this
were families without a male heir. Hence, the married daughters and the brothers-in-law were pre-
sumably not living in the household of the victim.
54 For example, after the homicide of Stjepan Radelja, the culprit settled first with the widow
and the son of the deceased, then with one of his brothers, and finally with the other brother (C,
vol. 8, f. 216). Mato ©aletoviÊ was killed by Vicko –uriÊ in 1746. The murderer reached a settle-
ment with the widow and the son of his victim in 1752, and two years later with the father and the
other members of the family (C, vol. 6, f. 222).
55 See Nenad VekariÊ, “Ubojstva u DubrovaËkoj Republici prije 300 godina”. DubrovaËki
horizonti 24 (1993) 33: p. 94.
56 For example, in 1698 Ivan, brother of the murdered Matko Vodopija, reached a settlement
with his murderer, Ivan MilkoviÊ, and married his daughter (Acta Cons. Maior., vol. 51, f. 52).
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A specific urban case: the Jewish community
All the cases analyzed above exemplify the relationship between the crimi-
nal justice system and rural communities. Structured local communities with
some autonomous prerogatives, as well as more complex and tenacious fam-
ily types, either gave solid backing to repressive institutions and criminal
policy or, contrarily, exhibited primordial vitality and resistance to the state’s
authority. The city of Dubrovnik was a completely different milieu, with a
vivacious circulation of its own inhabitants and foreigners. Generally speak-
ing, the people of the city belonged to less stable and less tough social micro-
structures. The families were nuclear (in which women had an economically
and socially more active position in the commoners’ families), while the
importance of the confraternities was restricted to religious functions and the
financial subsidy of their needy members.
However, one urban group formed an exception, and in many aspects was
closer to the tendencies which were typical of the rural environment. This
was the Jewish community. In the eighteenth century, the Jews made up about
0.7 percent of the entire population of the Republic of Dubrovnik, but almost
all Jews lived within the city, and made up some 4 percent of the urban popu-
lation.57 Jewish habitations were concentrated in one street which functioned
as a ghetto, but in this period the Jewish families became so numerous that
the authorities had to tolerate their housing in other parts of the city. The
Jewish community was not merely the most numerous non-Catholic group,
but also the only one with the right to its own religious observances.58 In ad-
dition, it was the sole religious group with a sort of collective individuality,
since from the seventeenth century on, Dubrovnik’s Jews had their own
confraternity, Schola Haebreorum.59
57  This calculation is based on the census of 1807. See StipetiÊ, “BrojËani pokazatelji”: p. 97.
The same proportion should be valid for the eighteenth century as well, since no research had shown
any important demographic change within the Jewish community of Dubrovnik in this period.
58 See Bernard Stulli, Æidovi u Dubrovniku. Zagreb: Jevrejska opÊina [etc.], 1989: pp. 42 and
44. The position of the Orthodox and Muslim inhabitants of the Republic of Dubrovnik never
reached this stage of autonomy. This was because few of them lived permanently in the city, but it
was also a result of the restrictive state policy in religious matters.
59 See Stulli, Æidovi: pp. 37-46 (pp. 9-10 of the English summary).
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In fact, whatever criterion formulated earlier in this paper were to be ap-
plied to the data on the Dubrovnik’s Jews, the existence of strong social co-
hesion would be noticed.
At first sight, the Jews seem to have committed crimes more often than
the rest of the population.60 This conclusion, however, could be misleading,
as almost the entire Jewish population lived in city, where the Criminal Court
was also competent for petty crimes. In fact, during the whole century there
was not a single case of homicide or death caused by wounding among the
Jews. On the other hand, the Jewish community was a group with a very pro-
nounced endogenous criminality, since almost one half of the eighteenth-cen-
tury cases involved both a Jewish offender and a Jewish defendant.
One interesting feature of the criminal justice policy towards the Jews is
that the Court tended to sentence them to higher alternative fines than the
rest of the population.61 What captures attention is that the Jews regularly
agreed to pay those fines so as to avoid the alternative penalty (usually im-
prisonment), and actually paid their fines in a short period of time.62 This
phenomenon could be explained by the sum the Court estimated, as it was in
accordance with the offender’s financial abilities. However, if we compare
these sums to what the non-Jewish well-to-do citizens were willing to pay,
another explanation emerges. There is no indication that Dubrovnik’s Jews
were particularly wealthy. However, it seems that they were able to summon
high amounts in a very short time because they could count on the solidarity
of other Jews.63 Naturally, one should not assume that recipients of this sub-
60 Some 1.3 percent of all the sentences of the Criminal Court concerned Jews, which is al-
most twice their proportion in the population.
61 In the penal system of the eighteenth-century Dubrovnik Republic the position of the im-
prisonment was central (74.8 percent). In some 20.5 percent of these cases the court conceded an
alternative to the convict, i.e. allowed him to pay a certain fine instead of going to prison. If the
convict was a Jew, the monetary equivalent of one day of prison was much higher (two to five
times) than in other cases. For more details on the penal system and this particular question see
Lonza, Pod plaπtem pravde: pp. 193-194.
62 For example, C, vol. 6, ff. 19, 169v, 181v; vol. 7, f. 197; vol. 8, f. 153v. There is only one
exception (vol. 8, f. 153v).
63 Moreover, in one seventeenth-century case, the Jewish community provided maintenance
for the imprisoned Jew (Stulli, Æidovi: p. 27).
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sidy were free of the obligation to pay back, but it is important to notice that
social ties among the members of the Jewish community were strong enough
to raise the money needed by one of its members on very short notice.
In a number of cases the collective responsibility was imposed on the Jew-
ish community as a whole. For example, in 1724 the Schola Haebreorum was
threatened with an extremely high fine in the case that any Jew disregarded
the order to deliver to the state authorities his copy of the Talmud (which
was to be destroyed).64 Furthermore, the Jewish community—just as any vil-
lage—had to denounce the return of a banished person, risking a very high
fine if they chose otherwise.65 As inhabitants of the city, the Jews were al-
ways a part of the general audience that watched exemplary punishments at
the gallows, the pillory, etc. But in one case, all Jewish boys were summoned
and obliged to observe the whipping of a young Jew.66 Finally, the Jewish
community also had limited disciplinary jurisdiction over its members.67
All the elements of the criminal justice system’s attitude towards the Jews
cannot be explained in a simple way, since some of them referred to very
complex theological and political issues. However, it seems convincing to me
that the Jewish community of Dubrovnik had some specific qualities of its
own—i.e., a much closer way of life, both in the physical and the social
sense—which enabled the criminal justice policy to approach not only the
individual, but also his social group.
Conclusion
As stated in the opening section of this paper, the criminal justice system
of the Republic of Dubrovnik addressed several social groups. The analysis
of different relations between the state policy and these groups proved that
the village (i.e., confraternity, parish, or kaznaËina) and the household were
by far the most relevant. The preference given to these two groups by the
criminal justice system was not accidental, but was based on an appropriate
64 See Stulli, Æidovi: pp. 47-48.
65 Diplomata et Acta saec. XVIII, vol. 3358, no. 24.
66 Diplomata et Acta saec. XVIII, vol. 3398, no. 10.
67 Ibidem, no. 39.
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evaluation of the social reality. The household and the village displayed high
cohesion, leading sometimes to recalcitrance in regard to the repressive sys-
tem. A certain degree of social intertwinement also provided a natural back-
ground for violent crimes.
Again, the analysis showed deeply rooted differences between urban and
rural social environments. Thanks to many factors—the greater territory, the
pronounced privacy, the general dynamics of life, the shape of the family,
and the less strictly determined lifestyle, to name just a few—both criminality
and the repressive system was different in the city than in the country. This
general conclusion is shaded (but in some way also re-confirmed) by the ex-
istence of the “urban exception”: the Jewish community. It had a closer terri-
torial frame, very strong cohesion in all sorts of everyday situations (from
endogamy to schooling and professional partnership), and a certain degree
of social isolation from the rest of the urban population. All these particu-
larities influenced the treatment of the Jews by the criminal justice system,
thus confirming the characteristic that a social group had to exhibit in order
to be a suitable target of the repressive policy.
This analysis of data from Dubrovnik indicates that criminal records can
be used with proficiency for the research of social structure. Criminality and
repression, both of which phenomena are strongly socially marked, display
valuable data on social groups, their shape, and internal cohesion.
